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Christopher R. Berry* 
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Abstract 
This paper targets the intersection of two generally distinct literatures: political 
control of administrative agencies and distributive politics. Based on a 
comprehensive database of federal spending that tracks allocations from each 
agency to each congressional district for every year from 1984 through 2007, we 
analyze the responsiveness of agency spending decisions to presidential and 
congressional influences. Our research design uses district-by-agency fixed 
effects to identify the effects of a district’s political characteristics on agency 
spending allocations. Because most agencies distribute federal funds, we are able 
to provide empirical evidence about the relationship between structural features 
of administrative agencies and the degree of political responsiveness of their 
spending decisions. Because allocation of funds constitutes a readily comparable 
metric over time and across agencies, we are able to evaluate a host of competing 
hypotheses about the political control of the bureaucracy by both Congress and 
the President.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the central issues in modern separation of powers debates is whether and how Congress 
and the President can control the bureaucracy. Yet, while existing work shows both that political 
principals structure agencies in ways that seem consistent with attempts to enhance political 
control, and that certain agency decisions seem responsive to the preferences of Congress or the 
President, there is virtually no large-n scholarship that demonstrates an actual link between 
agency design and responsiveness to political principals. By identifying an output of agency 
decisionmaking that is common across agencies and varies within an agency over time, we are 
able to test the proposition that structural features of agency design long hypothesized to 
constrain bureaucratic decisionmaking actually do so. In the process, we reemphasize the critical 
role of administrative agencies in distributive politics. Scholars of distributive politics have come 
to deemphasize agencies and scholars of bureaucratic politics have all but ignored spending as a 
relevant variable of interest. This article bridges these two important literatures.  
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 A significant and influential body of formal and empirical literature posits a principal-
agent problem between the legislature and the bureaucracy, the President and the bureaucracy, or 
both. It then takes agency structure as the dependent variable and analyses the design choices 
made by Congress and the president (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Lewis 2008; 2003). 
Whether or not these attempts to constrain the bureaucracy via institutional design are actually 
effective is a distinct and equally—if not more—important question. To address this question, a 
related literature attempts to document political influence exerted by congress or the president on 
a specific agency or policy domain (for example showing that congressional views affect a 
specific agency’s regulations or adjudication decisions).1  
Studies of individual agencies and particular policies have been enormously important, 
but they are largely incapable of identifying the role of agency design on responsiveness for two 
simple reasons. First, the relevant institutional features almost never vary within a single agency. 
Second, most policy outputs—where one would look to see evidence of political control—are 
not readily comparable across agencies. Regulations or enforcement decisions are difficult if not 
impossible to compare across agencies because there is no obvious metric for evaluating the 
responsiveness of a regulation promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency 
implementing the Clean Air Act relative to a decision by the Federal Trade Commission to 
prohibit a proposed merger. As a consequence, there has been very little quantitative scholarship 
that establishes a link between agency design and a similar agency output across agencies or over 
time.2 This article focuses on an activity common to and comparable across many agencies: the 
distribution of federal moneys.  
Allocative spending decisions are, of course, the main focus of distributive politics. Of 
late, however, this literature has become almost exclusively focused on the legislature.3 This 
omission is unfortunate because after Congress authorizes and appropriates funds the ultimate 
spending allocation decisions are usually made by the bureaucracy. Importantly, this is true not 
only for general programmatic appropriations—those lacking earmarks designating recipients—
but also the vast bulk of earmarked appropriations (Porter and Walsh 2008). Most earmarks are 
contained in committee reports or other aspects of the legislative history of a bill not enacted as 
part of the formal statute (Crespin, Finocchario, and Wanless 2009; Frisch 1998; Schick 2000), 
and therefore not legally binding on the agencies (GAO 2004). Agencies, of course, might well 
exercise their discretion so as to implement whatever legislative deal was struck; but, given the 
familiar principal-agent problem between the bureaucracy and political principles (Huber and 
                                                 
1 This literature is fairly large, but generally follows Weingast and Moran (1983).  Other illustrate examples include  
Weiganst and Moran (1983) (FTC); Moe (1985) (NLRB) Spence (1999) (FERC); Scholz and Wood (1998) (IRS); 
Hird (1991) (Corps of Engineers); Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast (1989) (ICC); Sabatier, Loomis, and McCarthy 
(1995) (Forest Service); Ringquist (1995) (EPA Office of Water Quality); Moore, Maclin, and Kershner (2001) 
(FERC); Krause (1994) (Federal Reserve); Coate, Higgins, and McChesney (1990) (FTC); de Vault (2002) 
(International Trade Commission); Wood (1990) (EEOC); Wood (1988) (EPA).   
2 Lewis (2008) has evaluated the link between agency design and program performance, essentially asking whether 
political appointees make bad bureaucrats/bad policy. This is a different issue, of course, than agency 
responsiveness per se.   
3 Bertelli and Grose (2008) and Ting (2009) reach the same conclusion.  As discussed below, this was actually not 
the case of early distributive politics scholarship.  For example, Arnold (1984) was expressly concerned with 
spending decisions made by the bureaucracy.  A pocket of recent distributive politics literature has focused on the 
President rather than agencies (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; McCarty 2000a, 2000b). But for one reason or 
another, the pork barrel politics evolved to be almost exclusively focused on the legislature.  
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 Shipan 2006; 2002), there is no shortage of reasons that an administrative agency might not 
perfectly implement legislative preferences. So long as agencies act as intermediaries in the 
process of allocating federal dollars, the failure to account for the bureaucracy in work on 
distributive politics is a glaring omission.  
In essence, the distributive politics literature displays a historical blind spot for agencies, 
while scholarship on the bureaucracy has generally ignored spending as an important class of 
agency behavior. This article bridges these two important literatures and in the process provides 
novel quantitative evidence about the relationship between agency design and political control of 
the bureaucracy. 
After next discussing the relevant literature in greater detail, we estimate a series of 
models of the distribution of federal funds by agencies to congressional districts. The analysis 
estimates the interaction between features of agency design and political conditions the 
distributive politics literature has established are associated with changes in the allocation of 
federal funds. That is, our empirical strategy tests whether political factors that are known to 
affect the receipt of federal funds by congressional districts (e.g. whether a district is represented 
by the President’s party) matter more for agencies with structural features that are thought to 
make them more susceptible to political influence. Our method allows us to test whether agency 
design is actually associated with political responsiveness, something the existing literature has 
been unable to test.   
   
I. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Our work relates to two longstanding literatures, one on the nature of political control of 
the bureaucracy by Congress and the President, and a second on distributive politics. We discuss 
each literature briefly and then discuss how insights from each field can help shed light on 
residual puzzles in the other.  
 
A. Political Control of the Bureaucracy  
Early scholarship tended to emphasize the bureaucracy’s technocratic expertise and 
celebrated agency insulation from politics (Landis 1938). A second generation took the lack of 
agency accountability to be a problem for governance rather than a solution, culminating in the 
1970s with a boon of scholarship emphasizing the pathologies of unaccountable bureaucratic 
entities (e.g., Lowi 1979). Several decades of scholarship then followed emphasizing the various 
ways in which Congress and more recently the President can (and allegedly do) exercise ex ante 
or ex post control over agency behavior. Today, both the principal-agent model of the 
bureaucracy and the potential mechanisms for managing agency problems are largely taken as 
given.4  
The main goals for agency design are to select the right type of agent and ensure that the 
agent exerts effort, utilizes expertise, and implements policy in keeping with political preferences 
of principals. Because agencies generally have better information or expertise than legislators, 
                                                 
4 An ongoing modern strain in study of the bureaucracy emphasizes the active role that bureaucratic actors take in 
establishing policy authority (e.g. Krause and Meier 2003; Carpenter 2001). 
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 but may also have different preferences, some mechanism is necessary to address the twin 
problems of preference divergence and information asymmetry (Huber and Shipan 2006). 
Although legislators presumably delegate authority to sympathetic agencies, both career civil 
servants and political appointees may have views that differ somewhat from the enacting 
legislative coalition (Nixon 2004). Agencies also have systematically better information than 
legislators and this informational advantage might refer to better knowledge about the underlying 
state of the world (regulation needed or not needed), to the technology for implementing policy 
(price controls versus cap and trade), or to the level of effort required to implement policy (see 
generally Aghion and Tirole 1997). Agency failure might be the result of good-intentioned 
mistakes (which Congress would prefer not to punish), or shirking (punish) (Brehm and Gates 
1997; 1993) or the intentional implementation of policy different than the enacting legislative 
coalition desired (which Congress would prefer to punish so long as the enacting coalition 
continues to exist). Ex post monitoring is important, but it is also costly (Aberbach 1990; Dodd 
and Schott 1979; Ogul 1976).  
A particularly pessimistic account of these agency problems arose in the late 1970s under 
the ‘delegation as abdication’ thesis, which dominated academic debates about the bureaucracy. 
Critics of the administrative state argued that an unaccountable headless fourth branch of 
government bureaucrats had come to run American politics (Lowi 1979). The unelected and 
uncontrollable bureaucracy—not the President or Congress—was said to drive important public 
policy (Schoenbrod 1993).  
The next generation of scholars, however, was reared on the structure and process thesis 
articulated by McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989) and refined by others (e.g., Macey 
1992; Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; 1994; Balla 1998; Ferejohn 1987). Although 
the structure and process school now has many variants, the simplest version asserts that 
legislatures can, in fact, control the exercise of delegated authority, in part, by carefully 
delineating agency structure and the process by which agency policy is formulated. Given the 
challenges of ex post monitoring (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), the structure and process 
literature tends to emphasize ex ante restrictions that mitigate the informational advantage 
enjoyed by agencies and stack the deck in favor of certain interests to ensure the durability of the 
original bargain. The most prominent of these mechanisms are the elaborate procedural 
requirements like those specified in the Administrative Procedure Act, which, for example, allow 
parties affected by potential regulations to comment on potential agency policy and provide an 
opportunity to challenge agency decisions in judicial proceedings (McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast (1989; 1987). A range of complementary mechanisms, however, exist as potential 
tools for political principals to control bureaucratic action. Restrictions on the appointment and 
removal of personnel (O’Connell 2008; Eisner and Meier 1990), ex ante review of proposed 
decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Bagley and Revesz 2006; Kagan 
2001), legislative vetoes, and alterations in funding (Wood 1988, 1990) or jurisdiction (Gersen 
2007; Macey 1992) are all potential mechanisms for political principals to control administrative 
agency behavior.  
The President of course, no less than Congress, has every reason to try to control the 
bureaucracy. Yet, the President faces a range of similar problems resulting from the possibility of 
preference divergence and information asymmetry (Moe 1985). The President’s ability to 
influence the bureaucracy also depends on a range of institutional features, including whether the 
agency’s leadership is insulated from Presidential removal, the organizational location of the 
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 agency inside or outside the cabinet hierarchy, and the extent of Presidential appointments in the 
agency, subject to (or not) Senate approval (Lewis 2003:44-45; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; 
Khademian 1996; Seidman 1998; Wood and Waterman 1994).  
It is generally thought—though rarely shown—that the agencies outside the cabinet level 
hierarchy and particularly those headed by boards with staggered fixed terms and for-cause 
removal provisions (commissions) are more functionally independent from the President and 
subject to greater Congressional control (Strauss 1984; Seidman 1998; Lewis 2008:47). The 
imposition of qualifications requirements by congress for political appointees that lead agencies 
may also generate less Presidential control and (perhaps) greater congressional influence (Lewis 
2003: O’Connell 2009). Similarly, having more politically appointed managers relative to civil 
service employees should enhance Presidential control over agency behavior (Lewis 2008:98). 
The structure and process tradition has been accompanied by qualitative evidence of 
political influence over this agency or that regulatory program. But in the past several years there 
has been more of a sustained effort to test the structure and process theories systematically (Balla 
1998; Eisner and Meier 1990; Wood and Waterman 1993, 1991). Unfortunately, virtually all of 
these efforts suffer from one key pitfall: studies of political influence on a single agency’s policy 
decisions cannot demonstrate a link between agency structure and political influence because 
agency structure is a constant in those studies. Moreover, comparing influence across agencies 
requires some comparable output variable, but adjudications and rulemakings—the most 
commonly studied form of agency policy output—are virtually impossible to compare across 
agencies. Although the output we use—spending—is an imperfect one, it nevertheless allows us 
to make headway in estimating how the potential mechanisms of political influence affect actual 
agency outcomes.  
 
B. Distributive Politics 
 The early distributive politics literature focused expressly on administrative agencies 
(Arnold 1979), but this emphasis was lost for many years as the literature became increasingly 
congress-centric. Baron and Ferejohn (1984) develop a model in which a legislator offers a 
proposal to divide a pot of federal money and show that the distribution of funds will either be to 
a minimum winning coalition if the amendment rule is closed or a broader distribution if the 
amendment rule is open. Other distributive models that rely on somewhat different theoretical 
assumptions make more universalist predictions (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast 1979, 
1989; Niou and Ordeshook 1991), meaning that districts should receive a more or less equal 
share of overall spending. In practice, both theoretical and empirical work suggests there is 
significant variation in the ability of legislators to obtain federal money for home districts 
(Helpman and Persson 2001; McKelvey and Riezman 1992; McCarty 2000; Knight 2005; 
Persson 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2002). 
In much of this work, the power to propose the initial allocation of funds produces an 
increase in the proportion the legislator is able to obtain (Yildirium 2007:168). Both committees 
and parties are key gatekeepers for authorization and appropriation of federal funds. Members 
serving on key committees, particularly in leadership positions, are generally thought to be better 
positioned to ensure their home districts receive funds (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Deering and 
Smith 1997; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1998). 
Empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Districts represented on Armed Services or Small 
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 Business receive more funds (Alvarez and Saving (1997), but those on Appropriations and 
Public works do not. Members on the Agriculture committee seem to receive more agricultural 
money, while membership on the Transportation committee yields systemic benefits (Knight 
2005), but representation on the Education and Labor committee does not (Heitshusen 2001). On 
net, empirical studies have failed to reveal the sort of consistent benefits the conventional 
theoretical literature predicts. Moreover, even in studies that find a correlation between 
committee membership and spending, it is difficult to identify the causal effect of committee 
membership as distinct from self-selection of members onto committees. 
 The inherited wisdom about the role of partisan control and congressional spending is 
similar (see Aldrich 1995; Binder 1997; Rohde 1991). The majority party controls the legislative 
agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007), which might mean that majority party membership 
should be positively correlated with the volume of federal funds brought home. Majority party 
members are thought to obtain more federal funds for their local districts, which might help them 
win reelection (Levitt and Snyder 1997). Empirically, some studies find a positive correlation 
between federal spending and the partisan affiliation of a district or the majority coalition in 
congress (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Balla et al 2002; Martin 2003), but some work finds little 
supporting evidence (Lowry and Potoski 2004; Evans 1994; Bickers and Stein 200_; Lauderdale 
2008). 
More recent work has emphasized the President’s influence over appropriations (Berry, 
Burden, and Howell 2010). If proposal power matters in bargaining, the President’s power to 
propose the initial budget could tilt the distribution of federal moneys in his favor. Indeed, the 
data show that districts represented by a member of the President’s party do receive more federal 
funds. In addition to the ex ante proposal influence of the President, the executive also has ways 
to influence the distribution of funds ex post. A point often left out of political disputes about 
legislative earmarks is that the most earmarks still entail bureaucratic discretion. Most earmarks 
are actually contained in legislative history are therefore not legally binding on agencies 
(Crespin, Finocchario, and Wanless 2009; Frisch 1998; Schick 2000; GAO 2004). To the extent 
that bureaucratic discretion is sometimes influenced by the President, the role of the executive 
branch in facilitating compliance or noncompliance with earmarks is obviously critical. A 
modest point, articulated here and in other recent work is that distributive politics models ought 
to give more attention to the executive branch rather than focusing solely on the internal 
dynamics of the legislature (Berry, Burden, and Howell forthcoming; Bertelli and Grose 2009; 
Ting 2009).  
However, once the locus of analysis shifts from Congress to the executive branch, both 
theoretical models and empirical analyses need to explicitly acknowledge the role of agencies in 
the spending process. If principal-agent problems are even fractionally as severe as the 
bureaucracy literature suggests, there is no good reason to suspect that bureaucratic organizations 
will be perfect agents with respect to distributing program funds while notoriously imperfect 
agents in all other policy domains. Indeed, an unwieldy body of law governs spending of 
budgeted funds (see generally Fisher 1975). In some contexts, the President or agencies may 
decline to spend appropriated funds at all, or to shift funds across programs within a budget 
account, or transfer funds from one budget account to another entirely (GAO 2004). 
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 Impoundment, rescission, and transfer of funds across budget accounts are controversial 
practices, but also fairly common historically.5  
 
C. Administrative Agencies and the Distribution of Federal Funds  
The modern focus on the legislature in the distributive politics literature is actually a 
sharp divergence from early scholarship. Arnold’s (1979) seminal work explicitly sought to 
understand the congressional-bureaucratic relationship with regard to geographic allocation of 
funds. He argued that rational bureaucrats would form an implicit bargain with the legislature: 
bureaucrats would distribute funds in a manner desired by legislators in order to maintain 
budgetary stability (Arnold 1979:22). On this view, agencies allocate funds to Congressional 
districts in order to curry favor, and therefore, target the districts of representatives who are 
relatively neutral or mildly opposed to the given program (Arnold 1979:58).  
More recently, Stein and Bickers (1995) argue that agencies “have both the opportunity 
and motivation to be responsive to requests for help from legislators and their constituents (Stein 
and Bickers 1995:7). In their model, agencies help constituencies become organized by working 
with interest groups, which will then support the agency’s programs in congress (Stein and 
Bickers 1995:49-50). Here too, agencies are said to desire stable or increasing budgets and 
therefore have an incentive to help legislators, constituents, and interests groups. A somewhat 
different account is offered by Bertelli and Grose (2009), who argue that agencies distribute 
funds in accordance with bureaucratic ideology and presidential electoral objectives. They show 
that Department of Defense and Department of Labor grants to states vary as a function of the 
ideological difference between the relevant cabinet secretaries and senators. Unlike Arnold 
(1974) who emphasizes agency preference for distributing funds to neutral congressional 
districts, Bertelli and Grose argue that agencies will distribute greater funds to ideological allies. 
Agencies are able to do this, in part, because: “These [agency] costs attenuate the possibility of 
political control over the bureau’s distributive policy choices increasing de facto the autonomy of 
the bureau to influence policy outcomes by leveraging the ideological distribution in the Senate 
to enhance support for its programs” (Bertelli and Grose 2009:931).  
Our work is very much in the spirit of this scholarship, but diverges in two respects. First, 
building on Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010), we argue that there are two principals that seek to 
influence agency spending decisions. It is not only the legislature that cares about bureaucratic 
spending; the President does as well. We therefore attempt to estimate and explain the influence 
of the President on the spending decisions of different agencies as well. Second, and more 
important, we contend that, if the institutional design literature is correct, the degree of 
responsiveness should itself be a function of agency structure. Rather than assuming that all 
agencies will be more or less equally responsive to the preferences of political principals, we 
seek to test whether agency political responsiveness varies as a function of agency structure. 
That is, our goal is to estimate the effect of agency structure on agency responsiveness.  
* * * 
                                                 
5 See Fisher (1975); Circular No. A-11, part 4, Instructions on Budget Execution, Executive office of the President, 
Office of Management and Budget (June 2008).   
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 In sum then, we take the principal-agent problem that inheres in the relationships between 
the bureaucracy, the legislature, and the president as a given. As emphasized above, prior studies 
(e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Lewis 2003) take agency structure as a dependent variable 
and seek to explain when and why the political principals try to use structure and process to 
constrain the bureaucracy. Rather than treat agency structure as the dependent variable, we treat 
it as an independent variable and test whether agency structure affects the degree of political 
responsiveness. To accomplish this, we focus on the federal funds distributed by agencies to 
congressional districts and ask whether those agencies with structural features claimed to 
facilitate accountability are more responsive to political factors in their funding allocations. For 
the reasons discussed above, we believe this is the first paper capable of testing whether agency 
structure in fact matters for controlling the bureaucracy.   
 
II. AGENCIES, MONEY, AND POLITICS  
A.  Background & Data   
The data on federal spending data come from the Federal Assistance Award Data System 
(FAADS), a government-wide compendium of federal programs. The FAADS archive 
documents the transfer of almost anything of value from the federal government to a domestic 
beneficiary; the data include virtually all federal programs other than spending on defense. In 
total, the database tracks approximately $25 trillion (in 2004 dollars) in federal expenditures 
from 1984 to 2007. Bickers and Stein (1995; 1991) assembled and collapsed quarterly FAADS 
files from fiscal year 1983 to 1997 into annual data files. Berry, Burden, and Howell (2009) 
extended the data through 2007. The complete database tracks the total dollar amount awarded 
by each non-defense federal program to recipients in each of 435 congressional districts during 
each of the fiscal years. To reflect the fact that money spent this year is based on the budget 
passed during the prior year, outlays in year t are assigned to the legislator who represented the 
district in year t – 1.6  
Unlike prior studies using FAADS, we disaggregate the data by federal agency. The 
revised dataset tracks the annual receipts of each congressional district from each originating 
federal agency. The total database contains nearly 200,000 agency-by-district-by-year 
observations. The term agency actually has several meanings in the political science and 
economics literatures and it is a term of art in administrative law. For example, an administrative 
law, the Administrative Procedure Act applies only to agencies, a term that has been interpreted 
broadly by courts to apply to most entities of the federal government that exercise significant 
government authority. Descriptively, an administrative agency tends to denote organizational 
units of the executive branch. Sometimes scholars use agency to mean large cabinet-level 
bureaucratic entities within the executive branch hierarchy (e.g. Department of Interior), 
sometimes smaller organizational entities within cabinet-level entities (e.g. the Bureau of Land 
Management within the Department of Interior), sometimes stand-alone bureaucratic entities 
(e.g. Environmental Protection Agency), and sometimes so-called independent agencies (e.g. 
Federal Communications Commission). In the current analysis, we focus on the highest possible 
of level of aggregation in the data, for example, analyzing spending flows from the Department 
                                                 
6 In the year following redistricting, such matches are not possible, and hence we drop these cases.    
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 of Interior rather than the sub-unit like the Bureau of Land Management. In other work, we plan 
to focus on spending patterns by these smaller units within larger agencies.    
To use the flow of federal dollars from agencies to districts as a way of evaluating the 
role of agency structure on political responsiveness, a first empirical challenge is to distinguish 
politically responsive agency spending from mission driven spending. To illustrate the 
distinction, observe that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) tends to 
distribute most of its outlays to urban areas. Urban areas have more Democratic voters and are 
more likely to elect Democratic members to represent them in Congress. Therefore, districts 
represented by Democrats receive most of the grant awards from HUD. It would be unwarranted, 
however, to conclude based on these facts that HUD’s grant allocations are being driven by 
political responsiveness to Democrats. Rather, the natural mission driven constituency of the 
agency overlaps the traditional political constituency of one of the two major parties, leading to 
an observed correlation between agency spending and district partisanship.  
Figure 1 shows that partisan correlations in agency outlays are a fairly general 
phenomenon. The figure presents a variable we call Democratic “tilt,” which is defined as the 
ratio of an agency’s annual outlays going to Democratic controlled districts relative to the share 
of seats in the House controlled by Democrats. Numbers greater than one indicate that 
Democratic districts receive more money from an agency than would be expected based on their 
seat share. For instance, if an agency gave 60 percent of its funding to Democratic districts when 
Democrats controlled only 50 percent of House seats, the observed tilt would be 1.2.  
Figure 1 demonstrates that all but four agencies in our data exhibit positive Democratic 
tilt. FEMA and NASA are among the agencies with the most extreme Democratic tilt, while the 
Department of the Interior is one of the few agencies that tilts in favor of Republicans. 
Nevertheless, because agencies have mission-driven objectives, and these objectives may happen 
to coincide with the presence of partisan voters in a district, it is not possible to conclude based 
on the sort of evidence shown in Figure 1 that particular agency spending allocations are (or are 
not) based on political considerations. That is, these summary data cannot establish whether the 
patterns result from underlying agency preferences, statutory constraints, mission driven 
priorities, or effective political control. To successfully identify a link between agency structure 
and political responsiveness, one needs a method to disentangle mission-related partisan 
correlations from allocations that are related to political forces.   
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We estimate the outlays received by each 
congressional district from each agency in each year as a function of the political attributes of the 
district’s representative, for example whether the district’s representative is a member of the 
majority party in congress, holds a committee chair, and so on. To partial out spending 
allocations based on natural mission driven connections between the agency and the district, we 
include district-by-agency fixed effects. This method accounts for any inherent factors that make 
a particular district more or less likely to receive funding from a particular agency. We are then 
able to estimate whether a district receives more (less) federal funds that it would be expected to 
receive, given mission driven spending. Identification in the models comes from changes in 
spending allocations and political variables, within a district-agency pair, over time.  
More formally, consider the following baseline model: 
ln(outlaysijt) = αij +  δt + ψXit + εijt    (1) 
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 where subscript i denotes (redistricting-specific) congressional districts, j denotes the originating 
federal agency, and t denotes the year. This method accounts for all observable and 
unobservable, time-invariant characteristics of both districts and agencies, as well as the 
interactions between districts and agencies, by including αij, which are agency-specific-
congressional district fixed effects. To control for secular changes in federal domestic spending 
over time, we include dummies, δt, for all but one year per redistricting period. The vector Xit 
contains variables measuring the political influence of the districts’ congressional 
representatives, explained below. The vector ψ contains regression coefficients, and εit is an error 
term, which we cluster by district.  
Within this framework, the coefficients ψ represent our measures of politically 
responsive spending. For example, when Xit contains a dummy variable equal to one for 
members of the Democratic party, a positive coefficient indicates that a district receives more 
federal funding during those years in which it sends a Democrat to Washington. The key 
identifying assumption is that the non-political attributes of a district make it otherwise prone to 
receive federal funds do not change simultaneously with the change in the political 
characteristics of its representative.7 To illustrate, return to the previous HUD example. If HUD 
gives more money to Democrats, on average, we do not consider this to be politically responsive 
spending. If, however, HUD gives significantly more money to the same district after it replaces 
a Republican representative with a Democrat, we consider this to be a politically responsive 
change in agency spending.  
 The coefficients ψ are of potential interest to the distributive politics literature in and of 
themselves.  They are not, however, the main quantity of interest for this paper. Rather, our goal 
is to utilize the spending outcomes to test whether agency design affects political responsiveness.  
To take one basic example, Strauss (1984) and others argue that agencies located outside the 
cabinet level hierarchy on the executive branch organizational chart are subject to much greater 
legislative influence than agencies within the cabinet level hierarchy. Our data allow us to test 
whether specific organizational features of agencies—long thought to be mechanisms for 
political principals to control administrative decisionmaking—are actually associated with more 
politically responsive spending. Econometrically, we investigate these relationships by extending 
equation (1) to include interactions between district political characteristics and agency 
organizational characteristics, as follows: 
ln(outlaysijt) = αij + δt + ψ(Xit · Zj) + εijt    (2) 
where Zj is a vector of agency attributes, to be explained below, and the remaining terms are as 
defined above.8 Note that the main effects of the agency attributes cannot be identified because 
they are subsumed in the agency-by-district fixed effects. The variables of primary interest—the 
interactions between agency and district characteristics—are identified by changes within 
districts over time in the political attributes of their representative. For example, if Xit contains a 
dummy variable equal to one for members of the majority party, a positive coefficient is 
indicative of politically responsive spending in favor of the majority, on average across agencies. 
A significant positive coefficient on the interaction of majority party status and an agency 
                                                 
7 This assumption strikes us as particularly reasonable given that we are using redistricting-specific fixed effects, so 
the amount of time over which a district’s attributes may change is at most a decade. 
8 We do not include a time subscript for Z because we use time-invariant agency attributes in most of our analyses, 
as explained below. However, in the robustness section we also report results using time-varying agency attributes. 
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 characteristic in Zj indicates that agencies with that that structural attribute are more politically 
responsive to the majority party than agencies without that structural feature.  In essence, we 
identify the main political spending effects and then ask whether these effects are different 
among agencies with structural features hypothesized to facilitate political control.     
 In principle, any agency characteristic that is thought to influence political responsiveness 
is a candidate for inclusion in Zj. We build on Lewis (2008) and focus mainly on one key 
organizational design variable: the proportion of political appointees in the upper echelons of the 
agency. Many of the fiercest recent debates in law and politics concern control over appointment 
and removals of agency personnel (Lewis 2008, 2003; Calabresi and Yoo 2008; Lessig and 
Sunstein 1994; Moe 1985). The basic intuition is that as the top level of an agency is filled with 
political rather than civil service staff, the agency’s decisionmaking will be more susceptible to 
political influence, more responsive to demands of political principals such as members of 
Congress or the executive branch. To measure this aspect of agency politicization, we compute 
the proportion of the agency’s top leadership positions that are politically appointed as compared 
to being career Senior Executive Service (SES) positions. The SES represents the most senior 
policymaking positions for career civil servants, and the ratio of political appointees to SES 
personnel is an indicator of the extent to which the key policymakers in an agency are directly 
chosen by their political principals. A close variant of this measure of agency politicization 
features prominently in the work of David Lewis (2008; 2003) and is a straightforward initial 
way to summarize the degree of agency insulation.  
The number of political appointees within an agency may change over time (Lewis 
2008). Some of these shifts in the number of appointees are the result of legal recategorization of 
existing agency jobs; others are the result of new jobs. Empirically, therefore, one might use 
either time-varying agency indicators of political insulation or an average indicator across years.  
Our results are robust to using either approach. However, for most of our analyses, we opt to 
report results using average agency politicization. Our reasoning is twofold. First, as shown in 
Table X, changes over time in this measure agency politicization are relatively small and 
inconsistent.  Hence we are reluctant to place much weight on them. Second, to the extent that 
agency politicization may be endogenous—a point we address explicitly below—using the 
average across 25 years mitigates the possibility that our results are being driven by changes in 
politicization that are caused by an agency’s recent past behavior. These points notwithstanding, 
we also report results using time-varying agency data in the robustness section below.  
    
C. Findings: Agency Design and Political Control  
The data on politicization and other structural features of administrative agencies come 
from Lewis, who generously makes his data publicly available.9 We matched the Lewis 
structural data with the FAADS spending data based on the originating agency for each federal 
spending program. Figure 2 shows the distribution of politicization among the agencies in our 
data. It appears that science-oriented agencies, such as NASA and NSF, have relatively low 
levels of politicization, as do agencies that administer major entitlement programs, such as the 
Social Security Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs. The most politicized 
agencies include the Department of Education, the National Foundation on the Arts and 
                                                 
9 Data and codebooks are available at Lewis’s web site: http://people.vanderbilt.edu/~david.lewis/data.htm.  
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 Humanities, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, and the Corporation for National and Community Service, where political 
appointees outnumber career SES staff in each case.  
Table 1 presents the results of our analysis. Model 1 of Table 1 estimates a version of 
equation (1) above and shows the impact of political factors on agency spending. For example, a 
positive coefficient on the variable indicating whether the district’s representative is a ranking 
member of any committee means that the district receives more funds with a ranking member 
than without a ranking member, all else equal. These are essentially baseline models, replicating 
the specification in Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010) but using data disaggregated by agency.  
The results in model (1) are largely consistent with the existing distributive politics literature. 
Notably, districts receive more federal funds from agencies when their representative is a 
member of the president’s party. Districts receive more funds when their representative has a 
committee chair or a ranking committee member. Freshman legislators do worse by their districts 
than more senior legislators. And, representatives elected by slim majorities receive more funds 
from agencies, which is consistent with the idea that legislators allocate funds to help electorally 
vulnerable colleagues. Finally, districts receive less federal money when they are represented by 
Republicans, as previously shown by Levitt and Snyder (1995). The only surprise in model (1) is 
the negative coefficient for membership on the Ways and Means Committee. 
With these baseline models in hand, model (2) estimates a version of equation (2) above. 
The political variables from the baseline model in the first column are interacted with the 
measure of agency insulation. It is the interaction coefficient that contains the core results of the 
paper.10 Once again, because we include agency fixed effects in our initial model and because we 
utilize time-invariant measures of agency insulation, we do not estimate the direct effect of 
insulation on spending. Rather, we interact the agency insulation measure with district political 
characteristics, asking whether political factors that affect the distribution of federal funds matter 
more or less for insulated agencies than for politicized agencies. Our main contribution is to 
estimate this differential responsiveness to political conditions as a function of agency structure.  
First consider the interaction between agency politicization a district’s representative’s 
membership in the president’s party. The main effect of membership remains positive and 
statistically significant: districts receive more funds from the average agency when represented 
by a member of the President’s party. The interaction term indicates that this effect is larger for 
more politicized agencies. In other words, being represented by a member of the President’s 
party matters more when agencies are politicized than when they are not. Figure 3 contains a 
graph of the marginal effect of membership in the president’s party as a function of agency 
politicization. As the proportion of political appointees in an agency increases by 22 percentage 
points (i.e., one standard deviation), the marginal increase in funding when a district moves into 
the president’s party increases by roughly 6.7 percentage points. Meanwhile, for highly insulated 
agencies—those with the lowest level of politicization by our measure—membership in the 
president’s party has no significant effect on district funding. 
                                                 
10 In all the interaction models, we mean-deviate agency politicization so that the main effects of the other variables 
can be interpreted as the effects for an agency with the average level of politicization. Without this mean deviation, 
the coefficients for the other variables would represent the effects for an agency with zero political appointees, 
something that does not exist in our data. 
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 The interaction between agency politicization and membership in the majority party is 
also significant, positive, and roughly comparable in magnitude to the interaction with 
membership in the president’s party. However, the main effect for membership in the majority 
party is smaller, and hence we cannot reject the hypothesis that members of the majority party 
receive no spending advantage from most agencies. Indeed, Figure 4 indicates that the majority 
party advantage is significantly greater than zero only for the most highly politicized agencies. 
Aside from the interactions of agency politicization with presidential and majority party 
alignment, note that most of the interaction terms do not yield statistically significant results. In 
other words, while being represented by a ranking committee member or a committee chair, for 
example, does produce an increase in funds received by the district, that increase does not 
depend on whether the agency administering those funds is insulated or politicized. Thus, the 
evidence indicates that agency insulation can, but does not always, mediate the nature and extent 
of political influence on bureaucratic action 
Given evidence that agency politicization mitigates presidential and congressional 
partisan factors, we next attempt to disentangle these two sorts of political influence on agencies. 
To do so, we distinguish political appointees that require Senate confirmation and political 
appointees that do not require Senate confirmation. If the fact of Senate confirmation provides 
for greater congressional influence—or put differently—less presidential control, then these two 
sorts of political appointees in an agency should make for two very different kinds of political 
influence. A large pocket of non-senate-confirmed political appointees should facilitate 
Presidential influence, but not congressional influence. A large pocket of appointees on which 
the Senate must sign off might imply appointees with greater legislative sympathies. The 
analyses in models (3) and (4) essentially replicate the earlier models using these two different 
types of agency politicization.  
The interaction of district political characteristics with the penetration of Senate-approved 
appointees to an agency is shown in model (3). The interaction term is highly significant for the 
majority party variable: the agencies with more Senate-confirmed appointees are more 
responsive when a district’s representative moves into (or out of) the majority party. Meanwhile, 
the interaction term for the president’s party remains positive, though it falls just shy of statistical 
significance (p = 0.12) and is notably smaller than the interaction with the majority party. In 
other words, agencies with more Senate-confirmed appointees are more responsive to members 
of the majority party, but not clearly more responsive  to members of the president’s party.  
Precisely the opposite is observed with respect to non-Senate confirmed appointees in model (4). 
The interaction between politicization and membership in the majority party in Congress is 
statistically insignificant and substantively small. However, the interaction between non-Senate 
confirmed appointees and membership in the president’s party is positive and highly significant.  
The overall pattern of results from models (3) and (4) is depicted in Figures 5a-d. In 
summary, agencies with a density of senate-confirmed appointees are more responsive than 
agencies with few senate-confirmed appointees when a district changes majority party status. 
The proportion of non-confirmed appointees has no relationship to the extent of an agency’s 
responsiveness to members of the majority party. Meanwhile, agencies with more non-confirmed 
appointees are more responsive to membership in the president’s party than agencies with fewer 
such appointees. Even Senate-confirmed appointees appear at least weekly responsive to 
membership in the president’s party, although the response is less than with respect to 
membership in the majority.  
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 Generalizing somewhat, it appears that adding either type of political appointee makes an 
agency more responsive to membership in the president’s party, while adding Senate-confirmed 
appointees, but not non-confirmed appointees, makes an agency more responsive to majority 
party members. This makes good sense of course. As political appointees integrate into agencies, 
those that did not have to go through senate confirmation are likely to be more responsive to the 
president and less responsive to the legislature. Politicization via appointments requiring 
legislative involvement seems to facilitate responsiveness to both political principals, though 
more so to the congressional majority.  
 
D. Robustness 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we ran a series of auxiliary models that 
varied case selection and model specification. First, we re-estimated the basic models of Table 1 
using time-varying measures of agency politicization. The data necessary to compute agency 
politicization are available every four years from the Plum Book (see Lewis 2008) and we 
linearly interpolated the values for the intervening years to produce annual estimates of agency 
politicization. Those results are shown in Table 2. Importantly, our estimates of the interactions 
between agency politicization and membership in the president’s and majority parties, 
respectively, do not change notably. If anything, the interaction terms become a bit larger when 
using the time-varying measure of politicization. The estimated main effect of agency 
politicization is itself negative, indicating that agencies receive smaller budgets at times when 
they are more politicized.11 This result is true with respect to politicization by non-confirmed 
appointees (model (3)) but not with respect to politicization by Senate-confirmed appointees 
(model (2)), which could be interpreted as evidence that Congress attempts to tie the purse 
strings of agencies when they fall under greater presidential control. As indicated above, 
however, we are hesitant to make much of the time-varying results.  
While pooling multiple agencies together is a key contribution of this paper, one concern 
may be that pooling agencies as disparate as the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the 
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is problematic, not least because of the vast 
differences in the size of their budgets. To a large extent, our agency fixed effects address this 
problem by limiting the analysis to within-agency changes in spending over time; that is, we 
compare changes in spending within the SSA across years to changes in spending in the ARC 
across years, effectively discarding the average difference in the level of spending between the 
two agencies. As a further robustness exercise, however, we also removed major entitlement 
programs from the data. We did so by following a tactic originally proposed by Levitt and 
Snyder (1995), which is to divide federal programs into “high-variation” and “low-variation” 
                                                 
11 This result seems consistent with McCarty (2004) and McCarty and Razaghian (1999). When the legislature has 
proposal power over resources given to bureaucrats but has limited control over personnel, except through 
confirmation of the President’s choices (Noken and Sala 2000), outcomes can be inefficient (McCarty 2004). If the 
President selects an official whose preferences diverge too much from those of the legislature, the legislature 
responds by reducing resources available to the agency. This appointments dilemma can be solved by centralizing 
appointment and budgetary authority in the same institution, or minimized by restricting the President’s removal 
power. By restricting the President’s ability to control officials after they are in put in office, the President can 
commit to a more moderate agency, which would in turn induce greater resources from Congress. The basic 
intuition is that if the President exerts a lot of ex post control of policy (and has preferences different than Congress), 
then the legislature will be hesitant to give the bureaucracy a lot of resources or discretion.  
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 categories.12 The low-variation category includes 26 major federal programs—all of which are 
housed in the Social Security Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services (mostly 
programs within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services), the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(mostly the Veterans Benefits Administration), and the Railroad Retirement Board—that together 
account for 76% of total spending in our data set. The high-variation category includes hundreds 
of smaller programs. If major entitlement programs are less susceptible to political manipulation, 
we should expect to see our results upheld for the low-variation category but not necessarily for 
the high-variation category. Indeed, this is precisely what we find, as demonstrated in models (1) 
and (2) of Table 3. The results for high-variation programs essentially mirror those shown above, 
while all but one coefficient in the low-variation model is insignificant. The one significant 
coefficient is the interaction between agency politicization and membership in the president’s 
party, although the substantive magnitude is vanishingly small: moving from a completely 
insulated to a completely politicized agency increases the presidential party’s spending 
advantage by one percentage point. 
As further evidence that our results are not being driven by any particular agency, we 
reran our model repeatedly, dropping one agency at a time. The resulting jackknifed standard 
errors are reported in model (3) or Table 3. Although the standard errors are, naturally, larger 
using this approach, all of the results of interest remain statistically significant at conventional 
levels. In addition, we tried a number of more ad-hoc approaches (results not shown). We 
dropped the Social Security Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services, 
which are the two largest agencies in our sample. We also tried removing the Appalachian 
Regional Commission and the Corporation for National and Community Services, which are the 
two most politicized agencies in our sample. In each case, the results do not vary in any 
significant manner.13 
A well-known issue with the FAADS data (e.g., Bickers and Stein 1994; Levitt and 
Snyder 1995) is that grants going to a state government are credited to the congressional district 
in which the state capital is located. As a result, the state capital district’s representative appears 
(spuriously) to be remarkably successful in winning federal projects. Our working assumption 
has been that the district-by-redistricting period fixed effects satisfactorily account for this issue. 
To validate this assumption, we also reran the model without including state capital districts. The 
results, shown in model (4) of Table 3, are not significantly different with this exclusion. 
Finally, we note that approximately 15% of the district-agency-year observations are 
zeroes; that is, there are years in which a given district receives no money from a particular 
agency. There are reasons to be concerned about the consistency of OLS estimates under these 
conditions (see Wooldridge 2002, ch. 16), and therefore we also ran a version of the model using 
Tobit estimation with agency-by-district random effects. As shown in model (5) of Table 3, the 
results are virtually unchanged. 
 
E. Other Agency Structures 
                                                 
12 For details, see the appendix of Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010). 
13 Complete results are available on request. 
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 As noted above, our empirical strategy is quite general.  In theory, our method can 
estimate the impact of any measurable agency characteristic on the degree of political 
responsiveness.  Although our measure of politicization or insulation is closely tethered to the 
existing agency design literature and strikes us as a sensible object of focus for our work, there 
are, of course, many other ways to insulate the bureaucracy from political influence. Almost all 
of these mechanisms are specified at the time an agency is created and thus existing scholarship 
tends to emphasize the political conditions during that time period (Lewis 2003; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999).  In this section, we analyze a handful of the most common mechanisms and 
discuss which we can meaningfully analyze within the constraints of our data and method.    
To reiterate an earlier point, the literature is not always consistent in its use of terms like 
insulation, independence, and politicization.  In constitutional law, independence is a legal term 
of art, referring to agencies headed by officials that the President may not remove without good 
cause. Such agencies are, by legal definition, independent agencies; all other agencies are not.  In 
the economics and political science literatures, however, the idea of independence tends to have 
a more functional meaning, either referring to the degree of actual or effective control exerted 
over the agency by other political institutions, or the agency’s location on the government 
organizational chart inside or outside the executive cabinet hierarchy.14 Descriptively, more 
functional insulation (less politicization) is thought to result when an agency is created outside 
the existing bureaucratic structure rather than within an existing cabinet department (Lewis 2003; 
Wood and Waterman 1994). Empirically, less insulation is associated with strong majorities 
during unified government and more insulation is associated with strong majorities in Congress 
in divided government (Lewis 2003: 60). 
Statutory limits on the President’s ability to appoint or remove agency heads are also 
thought to diminish Presidential influence.  If the President can remove the head of an agency for 
the failure to do as the President directs, the agency is not meaningfully independent.  Less 
politicization is also said to be associated with a commission or board structure, especially when 
combined with partisanship requirements and staggered terms (O’Connell 2008; Ho 2007; 
Strauss 1984). Statutory requirements for commissions may specify the length of term for 
members of a Commission, require representation of both parties on the board, or limit the 
President’s ability to remove commissioners (O’Connell 2008). The empirical evidence about the 
impact of these mechanisms, however, is mixed (O’Connell 2006). Hedge and Johnson (2002) 
find the EEOC and NRC—allegedly more insulated agencies—reduced regulation immediately 
after the Republicans took control of Congress in 1995. Weingast and Moran (1983) found that 
the FTC was surprisingly sensitive to changes in the composition of its congressional oversight 
committee. And Moe (1985) documented extensive political control of the NLRB, 
notwithstanding its board structure and limits on Presidential removal.  Once again, this literature 
tends to focus on changes in a single agency’s behavior over time precisely because agency 
outputs are very difficult to compare across agencies.   
Our analysis reveals no robust associations between these other prominent features of 
agency design and political responsiveness.   Replicating models such as those above but 
replacing the politicization variable with other attributes generally produces insignificant 
                                                 
14 Lewis, for example, treats the EPA as an independent agency because it is not located within the cabinet 
hierarchy. It is a stand-alone agency in this sense, even though the head of the EPA is selected by the President 
without partisan requirements or limitations on the removal power.    
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 interactions with district political variables. Having more branches of government controlled by 
Democrats at the time of the agency’s founding does not make an agency more responsive to 
membership in the Democratic party (or any other political variable). Agencies founded during 
periods of divided government are no more or less politically responsive than those founded 
during times of unified government. Nor does the ideology of the president in place at the time of 
the agency’s founding, as measured by his NOMINATE score. 
We do find evidence that agencies governed by a board or commission structure are more 
responsive to members of the majority party—i.e., there is a significant interaction between a 
commission indicator and the majority party dummy (but not the president’s party dummy). We 
emphasize caution with respect to this result, however for two reasons. First, the existence of a 
commission structure is virtually coterminous with other variables like term limits and limits on 
Presidential removal power. Any one of these mechanisms might be driving the result and they 
are observationally equivalent in our data.  Second, and related, there are only four commissions 
in our data and hence we are reluctant to draw firm conclusions based on these results.   
Finally, we must acknowledge that there are some important categories of hypotheses in 
the literature that we simply cannot test using our data and method. Some important agencies—
for example, the Federal Elections Commission or the Food and Drug Administration—do not 
spend much money on grant awards, and hence we can say little about their political 
responsiveness based on spending data. In addition, some agency structures that are hypothesized 
to affect political responsiveness do not actually vary across the agencies in our data set. For 
example, none of the agencies is located within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and 
hence we cannot test whether agencies in the EOP are more or less politically responsive. 
Similarly, there are some agency attributes that are either not available at an appropriate level of 
aggregation or not easily quantified in a manner suitable for our analysis. For instance, the 
seminal work of McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989; 1987) emphasizes agency procedures 
that require public notice and hearings, which have no natural analog in agency grantmaking. 
Moreover, the structure and process thesis has been elaborated most clearly in the context of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which applies to all federal agencies, at least as a default.  We 
have no reason to question the hypothesis that procedural requirements articulated in the APA or 
an agency’s organic statute influence political control of the bureaucracy, but because the rules 
apply to all agencies, it is a challenging hypothesis to test empirically.  
 
F.  Interpretation & Mechanisms 
The results presented above demonstrate a relationship between agency structure and the 
political responsiveness of agency spending. Agencies with a greater density of political 
appointees are more responsive to moves into or out of the president’s party when making 
spending allocations. Moreover, agencies with more Senate-confirmed appointees are more 
responsive to the majority party than to the president’s party, while non-confirmed appointees 
are more responsive to the president’s party, though not the majority party.  
How one interprets these relationships—that is, whether one believes they are causal or 
coincidental—will depend on one’s beliefs about the sources of variation in politicization across 
agencies. The prevailing view in the literature is that an agency’s level of insulation is heavily 
determined by the political conditions at the time of its founding (Lewis 2003). For instance, a 
common view is that during times of divided government, Congress will seek to insulate newly 
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 formed agencies from presidential influence by minimizing the number of political appointees 
relative to career civil servants.15 If agency politicization is determined by initial political 
conditions, and if past political conditions do not otherwise influence an agency’s current 
spending decisions, then agency politicization can safely be regarded as exogenous for the 
purposes of our analysis.  
Another plausible view of agency politicization is that presidents seek to place political 
appointees in those agencies that are otherwise expected to be least supportive—ideologically or 
programmatically—of the president (Lewis 2008). Under this view, the extent of politicization is 
influenced by expectations about the agency’s future political responsiveness (or lack thereof). 
This is a form of endogeneity that would bias us against finding effects of politicization on 
responsiveness to the president. In other words, our results for membership in the president’s 
party would likely be biased downward if it were the case that the most politicized agencies 
would be the most unresponsive to the president if the political appointees were removed. 
Our results would be biased upward—that is, the significant results related to 
membership in the president’s party and the majority party would be spurious—if political 
principals placed more appointees in those agencies that would be the most responsive anyway. 
While, admittedly, we cannot directly reject this possibility with data, we are skeptical about the 
existence of this form of endogeneity for two reasons. First, the existing literature on the origins 
of agency politicization does not offer any reasons to believe that this is the case; and indeed, 
there are reasons to believe just the opposite, as explained above. Second, our results show not 
only a general relationship between agency politicization and responsiveness, but differential 
results for Senate-confirmed versus non-confirmed appointees. Agencies with non-confirmed 
appointees are responsive to membership in the president’s party, but not the majority party, 
while agencies with Senate-confirmed appointees are more responsive to membership in the 
majority party than in the president’s party. Any plausible alternative explanation for our 
findings would have to account for these differences, and we have yet to identify an endogenous 
account of agency politicization that would spuriously generate both sets of results.  
To this point, we have said relatively little about the precise mechanisms by which 
agency design does or might facilitate political control.  Indeed, our results are consistent with 
two different types of political influence over agencies.  One interpretation of our results is that 
agencies are proactively seeking to curry favor with legislators by distributing grants to 
influential members. This theory would be consistent with Arnold (1974), who argued that 
agencies distribute funds in order to gain favor and maintain legislative support for agency-
administered programs. However, importantly, our main empirical finding is not that agencies 
funnel funds to important districts, but rather that more structurally insulated agencies do so at 
lower rates than less insulated agencies.  
A second interpretation therefore runs roughly as follows. The actual (rather than 
legislatively agreed upon) distribution of federal funds relies on imperfect bureaucratic agents 
with preferences potentially divergent from those of the legislature or the president. The ability 
to select certain individuals that will make decisions about the distribution of federal funds 
should allow a principal to select the “right type” of appointee: that is, an appointee with 
preferences sympathetic to the principal. Although our data cannot demonstrate that this 
                                                 
15 Similarly, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) emphasize the underlying political conditions (e.g. divided government)  
at the time a statute is enacted as determinants of the nature and extent of delegated authority.  
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 mechanism is driving the empirical results, they are at least consistent with this story.  Agencies 
with more appointees subject to legislative confirmation are more responsive to legislature-
centered political factors.  Agencies with more appointees that do not require legislative 
confirmation and are therefore picked solely by the President—are more sensitive to Presidential 
political factors. Ex post mechanisms of control might also facilitate political influence, but ex 
post mechanisms of control such as oversight hearings and budgetary sanctions are generally 
equally applicable to agencies dominated by both sorts of appointees. The ex ante selection 
effect seems quite consistent with the results from Table 2.    
 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
Our main result is to demonstrate that one prominent structural feature of agency 
design—namely, the extent of high-level personnel politicization—affects the degree of political 
responsiveness by the agency. So far as we are aware, this is the first paper with an empirical 
strategy capable of showing an actual link between agency structure and political influence. To 
establish this link, we focus on an output common across agencies: the distribution of federal 
funds. The results have broad implications for the literatures on agency design, distributive 
politics, and comparative control of agencies by the President and Congress.  
The scholarly literature on congressional control of the bureaucracy has been quite 
successful in formalizing the nature of the principal-agent problem and providing ex post rational 
reconstructions of choices about agency design (e.g., Bawn 1993; McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast 1989; Cornell, Noll, and Weingast 1976; Moe 1990). Similarly, enormous progress has 
been made to show that Congress utilizes structural features of agency design in an attempt to 
exert greater control over the bureaucracy (Lewis 2003; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). Related, 
a long and useful line of scholarship on individual agencies has provided evidence of political 
influence on particular decisions by particular agencies. Because agency structure does not 
usually vary within a given agency, such studies are generally incapable of establishing a causal 
link between agency structure and political control. Indeed, until recently agency structure was 
rarely actually used as independent variable.  
Recently, Lewis (2009; 2007) has argued that agency structure and the degree of 
politicization in particular affects program performance. Lewis finds that programs that are run 
by political appointees perform worse—according to independent evaluations— than programs 
that are not (Lewis 2007). Although our analysis says nothing about agency performance per se, 
our results fit together reasonably well with these findings. If highly politicized agencies place 
more weight on political considerations when making programmatic decisions, while less 
politicized agencies place greater weights on the merits, it would be unsurprising that the latter 
perform better according to objective criteria. To be clear, our results do not prove that this 
account is correct, but they do cohere with Lewis’ finding in this respect. Similarly, O’Connell 
(2008) shows that agency structure affects patterns of rulemaking by agencies. Although our 
analysis goes directly to political responsiveness, there is increasing interest in testing whether 
agency structure matters for policy outputs in a more systematic way.  
 The literature on delegation and oversight has long focused mainly on Congressional 
control of administrative behavior, but more recently the literature has shifted toward the 
President and the associated multiple-principal problems. When both the President and the 
legislature seek to influence agency spending decisions, this produces a distinct problem and 
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 opportunity for the agency (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010; Bertelli and Grose 2009). It might 
be taken to increase agency slack and reduce agency accountability. Our results, however, 
indicate that agency design affects both legislative and presidential influences on the 
bureaucracy.  
Our work also speaks to the ongoing debate about the degree to which agencies are 
influenced by Congress versus the President and why. A common critique of the George W. 
Bush administration was that it politicized the bureaucracy. In an effort to exert greater control 
over policymaking by administrative agencies, the administration was said to have inserted more 
layers of political appointees into the bureaucracy.16 The main objection to this practice was 
twofold. First, it injected political or ideological influences into domains that were alleged to be 
better guided by technocratic expertise and neutrality. That is, the practice seemed to allow crass 
politics to trump scientific judgment. Second, and more important for current purposes, it was 
alleged to shift the locus of power from administrators to whom Congress had expressly 
delegated policymaking authority to the President. Presidential politicization was said to increase 
executive influence at the cost of congressional influence.  
 Our analysis shows this concern is both right and wrong. It is right in the sense that 
adding political appointees to an agency does increase agency responsiveness to the President. 
The concern is wrong—or at least incomplete—in the sense that politicization of this sort can 
also increase legislative influence. Non-senate confirmed appointees appear to facilitate 
presidential control, but Senate-confirmed appointees appear to facilitate legislative control. 
Setting aside the normative status of bureaucratic insulation, we note that the decision to 
politicize is actually a double-edged sword. Inserting partisans into the agency may facilitate 
Presidential control, but it may also simultaneously increase the degree of Congressional control.  
The results also provide some additional fodder for the broader debate about 
accountability in the bureaucracy. Contra the delegation as abdication thesis advanced by Lowi 
in the 1970s and Schoenbrod in the 1990s, we find that agency decisions about funding are, in 
fact, responsive to political conditions. It may be good or bad to have responsive agencies, but 
the notion of untethered agencies floating adrift in an ocean of discretion does not seem 
consistent with the data on the ground. Moreover, the extent of agency accountability to both the 
President and the Congress is a partial function of how a given agency is structured and 
designed. At one level, this is a banal claim. Yet, this core assumption of modern political 
science has gone almost entirely untested empirically.  
Political control of the bureaucracy is, of course, imperfect, and therefore our work is 
directly relevant to the distributive politics literature as well. Crafting a legislative coalition and 
reaching internal agreement on which district should get which funds is only the starting point 
for the distribution of federal funds. Ensuring that the legislative bargain is implemented 
remains. As is the case for other bureaucratically administered federal policies, agencies are not 
costless pass-throughs for legislative judgments. Both the legislature and the executive must seek 
mechanisms through which agency discretion can be controlled. A deal that is formed without 
explicit consideration of these principal-agent problems may go significantly awry. We propose 
that more serious attention should be given to the agency implementation problem in the domain 
                                                 
16 See Lewis (2008) for a comprehensive treatment of historical attempts to politicize agencies.  
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 of distributive politics and to the relationship between agency design and political control, a shift 
that would extend some of the themes from Arnold (1974) and Bickers and Stein (1995).  
Such a conceptual move is closely related to the ongoing debate about earmarks in the 
budget process. Most earmarks constitute not legal obligations but instead statements about 
legislative views regarding the allocation of federal funds. Given this fact, debates about 
earmarks that ignore the role of agencies are starkly incomplete. Although most accounts of 
agencies in the federal budgetary process theorize why agencies have an incentive to implement 
legislative bargains (Bickers and Stein 1995; Arnold 1974), like Bertelli and Grose (2009), we 
emphasize that the agency has many reasons not to. There is virtually no domain in which 
scholarly consensus suggests agencies simply implement congressional views and it would be 
surprising if this were the case for earmarks and administrative spending.  
Indeed, most normative evaluations of earmarks depend on how often those earmarks are 
implemented by the bureaucracy. If most earmarks are the equivalent of legislator speeches on 
the floor and virtually ignored by bureaucrats allocating funds, the earmarks debate is much ado 
about nothing. If the bureaucracy does exactly what legislators request, the earmarks debate is 
critical. Our point is not that earmarks are unimportant, but rather that the degree of influence 
will vary depending on how agencies are designed. Like all agency outputs, the ability of 
political principals to affect agency decisions depends on the extent of the principal-agent 
problem and the available mechanisms to help solve it. We have focused on only one of several 
potential measures of bureaucratic insulation and politicization. Nevertheless, the analysis 
suggests that agency design affects the magnitude of congressional and presidential influence on 
agency spending decisions.   
CONCLUSION  
 This paper draws together two largely disparate literatures in an attempt to make 
headway on core problems in scholarship on the bureaucracy and distributive politics. By 
focusing on the distribution of federal funds by administrative agencies, we sought to test the 
proposition that agency design facilitates the control of the bureaucracy by congress and the 
president. We showed that agency structure is associated with changes in the political 
responsiveness of agency spending allocations. As such, our analysis provides fodder for several 
ongoing debates about the relationship between the legislature, the president, and the 
bureaucracy. Political influence is not uniform across agencies, but varies in predictable ways as 
a function of agency design. Rather than claiming that some institutional features could plausibly 
or might theoretically facilitate influence by the president or the legislature, our identification 
strategy is capable of establishing an empirical link between agency structure and political 
control. Rather than estimate the probability that Congress relies on structure and process to try 
to make agencies responsive to their political principals, we show that agencies are in fact more 
responsive to both congress and the president as a function of these structural features. 
Importantly, however, we also find null results for several features of agency design that are said 
to facilitate political control of administrative agencies. To be sure, our analysis focuses only on 
one type of agency output: agency spending. We cannot rule out the possibility that agency 
behavior with respect to rulemakings and adjudications differ entirely. Nor can we persuasively 
analyze all features of agency design that might facilitate political control. Nevertheless, we 
believe our method and analysis provide a novel approach to one of the core issues in the modern 
study of political institutions.  
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Figure 1: Democratic Tilt by Agency 
Note: Tilt is defined as the percentage of the agency’s dollar awards going to Democrat-represented districts divided 
by the percentage of House seats held by Democrats. 
 
Figure 2: Agency Politicization 
Note: Politicization is defined as the average number of  political appointees divided by the sum of the average 
number of political appointees plus the average number of SES personnel in the agency, 1984-2008. 
0 .5 1 1.5
Avg. Democratic Tilt
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Corporation for National and Community Service
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
National Science Foundation
Department of Transportation
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of Labor
Department of Justice
Department of Education
Small Business Administration
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Commerce
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Agriculture
Social Security Administration
Department of Veterans Affairs
Railroad Retirement Board
Department of the Interior
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Agency Politicization
Appalachian Regional Commission
Corporation for National and Community Service
Department of Education
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Small Business Administration
Department of Agriculture
Department of Labor
Department of Justice
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of Defense
Department of Commerce
Department of the Interior
Railroad Retirement Board
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Department of Transportation
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Energy
Environmental Protection Agency
Social Security Administration
Department of Veterans Affairs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Science Foundation
32
  
Figure3: Marginal Effect of Membership in the President’s Party by Agency Politicization 
 
 
Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Membership in the Majority Party by Agency Politicization 
Note: Vertical lines denote the average value of agency politicization. 
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Figure 5a: Marginal effect of membership in the president’s party, Senate-confirmed appointees 
only. 
 
Figure 5b: Marginal effect of membership in the majority party, Senate-confirmed appointees 
only. 
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Figure 5c: Marginal effect of membership in the president’s party, non-confirmed appointees 
only. 
 
Figure 5d: Marginal effect of membership in the president’s party, non-confirmed appointees 
only.  
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Table 1: Agency Politicization over Time
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Corporation for National and Community Service 77.3% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0%
Department of Agriculture 46.9% 47.1% 43.5% 45.1% 46.5% 40.7% 39.7%
Department of Commerce 31.6% 32.1% 31.5% 33.7% 24.9% 32.8% 30.1%
Department of Defense 39.8% 33.9% 32.1% 34.0% 31.4% 34.1% 35.5%
Department of Education 64.4% 70.6% 65.0% 65.0% 65.5% 62.0% 61.5%
Department of Energy 17.7% 19.0% 19.7% 21.8% 22.2% 20.3% 19.5%
Department of Health and Human Services 24.3% 21.7% 20.6% 20.1% 19.9% 25.6% 24.0%
Department of Housing and Urban Developm 59.6% 54.4% 48.9% 50.2% 52.7% 48.4% 43.4%
Department of Justice 54.7% 50.4% 38.0% 37.2% 31.9% 36.7% 31.7%
Department of Labor 39.2% 39.4% 41.5% 42.4% 36.0% 45.9% 48.4%
Department of Transportation 29.9% 27.2% 18.4% 26.0% 31.2% 28.8% 30.3%
Department of Veterans Affairs 11.6% 10.6% 8.8% 9.3% 11.8% 13.4% 11.6%
Department of the Interior 30.1% 29.1% 28.7% 27.4% 25.6% 24.1% 24.1%
Environmental Protection Agency 20.6% 14.9% 17.8% 16.4% 12.9% 18.3% 19.1%
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 34.0% 36.5% 28.8% 24.1% 19.2% 17.5% 21.6%
Federal Emergency Management Agency 35.4% 36.9% 40.2% 31.0% 36.0%         
National Aeronautics and Space Administr 3.3% 2.0% 1.6% 2.6% 4.6% 3.7% 3.8%
National Foundation on the Arts and the 68.0% 57.1% 50.0% 54.8% 50.0% 54.3% 41.2%
National Science Foundation 4.9% 2.0% 1.9% 2.0% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3%
Railroad Retirement Board 33.3% 26.7% 23.5% 23.5% 28.6% 30.8% 30.8%
Small Business Administration 54.8% 55.2% 44.8% 44.0% 45.2% 53.3% 50.5%
Social Security Administration 12.5% 11.2% 12.7% 8.5%
Source: Plumbook data, courtesy of David Lewis. Politicization is defined as the number of political appointees divided by the sum of politcal appointees plus 
Senior Executive Service personnel.
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Baseline Agency 
Politicization
Senate 
Confirmed
Non-
Confirmed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
President's party 0.051** 0.051** 0.050** 0.052**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
x Agency  Politicization 0.301*** 0.279 0.382***
(0.108) (0.178) (0.133)
Majority Party -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
x Agency Politicization 0.311** 0.689*** 0.125
(0.141) (0.209) (0.177)
Republican -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.127*** -0.125***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
x Agency Politicization -0.053 -0.056 -0.083
(0.161) (0.261) (0.205)
Leader -0.145 -0.161 -0.162 -0.160
(0.147) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
x Agency Politicization 0.349 -0.566 1.032
(0.640) (0.981) (0.820)
Committee Chair 0.096* 0.098* 0.098* 0.097*
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
x Agency Politicization -0.066 -0.209 0.017
(0.241) (0.320) (0.329)
Ranking Member 0.132** 0.123** 0.123** 0.123**
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
x Agency Politicization -0.012 0.242 -0.186
(0.231) (0.370) (0.286)
Appropriations 0.045 0.039 0.039 0.039
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
x Agency Politicization 0.197 0.216 0.229
(0.181) (0.284) (0.256)
Ways and Means -0.153*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.159***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
x Agency Politicization 0.186 0.340 0.125
(0.259) (0.406) (0.324)
First Term -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.084***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
x Agency Politicization 0.234** 0.294** 0.245*
(0.101) (0.149) (0.132)
Close Election 0.066** 0.066* 0.066* 0.066*
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
x Agency Politicization -0.151 0.033 -0.305*
(0.138) (0.225) (0.179)
Number of observations 203,837 194,735 194,735 194,735
R2 (within) 0.068 0.070 0.070 0.070
Table 2: Agency Agency Politicization and District Spending
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the dollar value of federal awards by agency, 
district, and year. All models include agency-by-district fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard 
errors clustered by agency-district are reported in parentheses.  Agency politicization  is defined as 
the average number of political appointees divided by the sum of the average number of political 
appointees plus the average number of SES personnel. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Politicization Senate 
Confirmed
Non-
Confirmed
(1) (2) (3)
Agency Politicization -2.400*** 0.443 -2.015***
(0.388) (0.345) (0.281)
President's party 0.051** 0.046* 0.051**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
x Agency Politicization 0.394*** 0.264 0.460***
(0.113) (0.179) (0.128)
Majority Party -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
x Agency Politicization 0.283** 0.595*** 0.063
(0.143) (0.189) (0.172)
Republican -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.122***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
x Agency Politicization -0.016 -0.078 0.024
(0.161) (0.242) (0.189)
Leader -0.190 -0.190 -0.188
(0.154) (0.154) (0.153)
x Agency Politicization 0.314 -0.301 0.705
(0.645) (0.840) (0.785)
Committee Chair 0.097* 0.098* 0.097*
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
x Agency Politicization -0.096 -0.169 -0.043
(0.240) (0.284) (0.311)
Ranking Member 0.120** 0.121** 0.121**
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
x Agency Politicization -0.011 0.179 -0.165
(0.229) (0.339) (0.273)
Appropriations 0.045 0.044 0.044
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
x Agency Politicization 0.305* 0.200 0.392*
(0.182) (0.276) (0.238)
Ways and Means -0.165*** -0.164*** -0.166***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
x Agency Politicization 0.146 0.190 0.112
(0.254) (0.351) (0.293)
First Term -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.078***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
x Agency Politicization 0.299*** 0.388*** 0.243*
(0.100) (0.137) (0.127)
Close Election 0.066* 0.066* 0.066*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
x Agency Politicization -0.165 -0.021 -0.267
(0.138) (0.219) (0.170)
Number of observations 191,388 191,388 191,388
R2 (within) 0.072 0.071 0.072
Table 3: Time-Varying Agency Politicization
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the dollar value of federal 
awards by agency, district, and year. All models include agency-by-district fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by agency-district are 
reported in parentheses.  Agency politicization  is defined as the number of 
political appointees divided by the sum of the number of political appointees plus 
the number of SES personnel in each year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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High-
Variation 
Programs
Low-
Variation 
Programs
Jackknife
Dropping 
State 
Capitals
Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
President's party 0.049** -0.002 0.051* 0.023 0.082***
(0.024) (0.001) (0.027) (0.029) (0.024)
x Agency Politicization 0.300*** 0.011** 0.301* 0.357*** 0.295**
(0.109) (0.005) (0.169) (0.129) (0.116)
Majority Party -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.026
(0.031) (0.002) (0.038) (0.037) (0.024)
x Agency Politicization 0.313** 0.002 0.311** 0.322* 0.431***
(0.141) (0.007) (0.127) (0.165) (0.121)
Republican -0.129*** 0.001 -0.125** -0.148*** -0.174***
(0.038) (0.002) (0.050) (0.051) (0.032)
x Agency Politicization -0.111 -0.006 -0.053 -0.110 0.095
(0.161) (0.008) (0.270) (0.204) (0.156)
Leader -0.185 0.004 -0.161 -0.039 -0.193
(0.152) (0.010) (0.150) (0.182) (0.125)
x Agency Politicization 0.563 0.009 0.349 0.225 -0.031
(0.645) (0.032) (0.836) (0.641) (0.638)
Committee Chair 0.096* 0.003 0.098 0.101 0.077
(0.058) (0.004) (0.062) (0.069) (0.052)
x Agency Politicization -0.060 -0.011 -0.066 0.088 -0.025
(0.242) (0.015) (0.240) (0.284) (0.265)
Ranking Member 0.122** -0.001 0.123** 0.145** 0.187***
(0.054) (0.003) (0.060) (0.062) (0.051)
x Agency Politicization -0.017 0.015 -0.012 -0.184 0.174
(0.231) (0.012) (0.207) (0.260) (0.260)
Appropriations 0.040 0.001 0.039 0.039 0.130***
(0.046) (0.003) (0.050) (0.057) (0.043)
x Agency Politicization 0.190 -0.007 0.197 0.270 0.334
(0.181) (0.009) (0.165) (0.219) (0.213)
Ways and Means -0.156*** -0.002 -0.159*** -0.147** -0.034
(0.059) (0.004) (0.043) (0.071) (0.049)
x Agency Politicization 0.209 0.009 0.186 0.059 0.043
(0.258) (0.012) (0.126) (0.314) (0.246)
First Term -0.083*** 0.000 -0.084*** -0.068** -0.068***
(0.023) (0.002) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024)
x Agency Politicization 0.233** 0.006 0.234 0.343*** 0.190
(0.101) (0.006) (0.161) (0.121) (0.119)
Close Election 0.070** -0.001 0.066* 0.029 0.058*
(0.034) (0.002) (0.038) (0.042) (0.034)
x Agency Politicization -0.169 0.003 -0.151 -0.192 -0.144
(0.138) (0.006) (0.157) (0.164) (0.170)
Number of observations 194,735 194,735 194,735 155,721 194,735
R2 (within) 0.077 0.033 0.070 0.067
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the dollar value of federal awards by agency, district, 
and year. All models include agency-by-district fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered 
by agency-district are reported in parentheses, except for model (3), which reports jackknifed standard 
errors computed by dropping one agency at a time. Agency politicization  is defined as the average number 
of political appointees divided by the sum of the average number of political appointees plus the average 
number of SES personnel. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Robustness
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